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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CODY DALE WILLARD,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 45204
Ada County Case No.
CR-2016-24397

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Willard failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a
unified sentence of six years, with two years fixed, upon his guilty plea to aggravated battery?

Willard Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
Willard pled guilty to aggravated battery while in a correctional facility and the district
court imposed a unified sentence of six years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.99-102.) Willard
filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.130-34.)
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Willard asserts his sentence is excessive in light of his difficult childhood, substance
abuse issues, young age, and purported remorse.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5.)

The record

supports the sentence imposed.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). It is presumed
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. State
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. The
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when
deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens,
146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
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The maximum penalty for aggravated battery is 15 years in prison, and per statute, the
commission of a felony while in a correctional facility requires that the sentence for that felony
offense be served consecutively to any other sentence. I.C. §§ 18-908, 19-2520F. The district
court imposed a unified sentence of six years, with two years fixed, to be served consecutively to
the sentence Willard was already serving, and that sentence falls well within the statutory
guidelines. (R., pp.99-102.) Furthermore, Willard’s sentence is appropriate in light of the
seriousness of the offense, Willard’s ongoing criminal offending, disregard for the terms of
supervision while incarcerated, and his high risk to reoffend. (PSI, pp.42-47.)
While incarcerated for grand theft, Willard attacked another inmate in the gym. (R, pp.89, PSI, pp.142-43.) The other inmate sustained five broken ribs and a black eye as a result of the
attack. (PSI, p.260.) Willard claimed he attacked the victim because the victim called him a
“bitch” and a “nigger,” and that the fight started when the victim spit on Willard’s face and hit
him six to seven times.

(PSI, pp.142-43.)

However, Investigator Burroughs watched the

security camera footage of the incident and reported that Willard attacked the victim while he
was sitting on a workout bench, and that the victim did not strike Willard at all during the attack.
(PSI, p.142.) Another inmate also reported that “Ryan McGarvin had ordered the ‘hit’ on the
victim,” and that McGarvin and Willard “run around with each other and are tight.” (PSI,
p.142.) Willard’s substance abuse issues, young age, and purported remorse do not outweigh the
seriousness of the offense.
At sentencing, the district court articulated its reasons for imposing Willard’s sentence
stating, “Now, I realize you had some struggles as a youngster. I did read the entire earlier
presentence report, and I have read the rider review report. But I am concerned about the level
of violence here.” (4/25/17 Tr., p.36, Ls.20-24.) The state submits that Willard has failed to
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establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpt of the
sentencing hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on appeal. (4/25/17 Tr.,
p.36, L.4 – p.38, L.21, Appendix A.)
Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Willard’s conviction and sentence.
DATED this 10th day of January, 2018.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming__________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

ALICIA HYMAS
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 10th day of January, 2018, served a true and correct
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
MAYA P. WALDRON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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flopped, sent to prison, I didn't have the
mindset, nor was I ready to grow up. This
incident In this case, it opened my eyes a lot, as
well as being where I've been In the last year.
And I've had a lot of time to reflect on It and to
work on myself.
By no means, you know, am I not
remorseful for this. And In the last year, I
tried to do a 180, 100 percent. It's been going
on 13 months since I have had a disciplinary
write-up.
Parole, I went in front of -- I go back
in front of them In September. I also started my
Thinking for Change, as well as my anger
management classes. And they're willing to give
me a six-month date after my classes are
completed, which I have learned a lot from, my
classes and doing time In max that I have done.
As a result of this incident, it has
been four months in ad-seg with absolutely
nothing, which was justified for punishment, as
well as, until I am released from parole, I'll do
the rest of my time in max because of this. I
have had a pretty severe punishment, as far as
inside the institution goes.
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1
And I have a four-year-old son out
2 there who Is waiting on me and depending on me to
3 come home. I've been out of his life for three
4 years now, and it was real selfish to make the
5 decisions and the choices that I have made to
6 continue myself in my stay Inside this prison.
7 And I believe one year fixed, which would go along
8 with my parole board, Is fair punishment for what
9 has happened.
10
And that's all I have to say.
11
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Willard.
12
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir .
13
THE COURT: Mr. Rolfsen, any comment about
14 the no-contact order?
15
MR. ROLFSEN: No, Your Honor.
16
THE COURT: Mr. Guy, is there a reason you
17 used a multi-party Instead of the single party
18 NCO? Mr. Guy?
19
MR. GUY: Your Honor, I mistakenly
20 thought -- and I'm sorry if I did this -- in fact,
21 that Is the form that we were using for each and
22 every case.
THE COURT: Actually, until the Supreme
23
24 Court tells us otherwise, we have two forms, one
25 for a single person, one for multi party. And I
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1 just -1 assuming It does In an Institution -- of someone
2
MR. GUY: I can get a single party, Your
2 making light of this.
3 Honor.
3
So under -- considering all the
THE COURT: No, that's fine. I will go
4
4 circumstances, it seems to me that the two year
5 ahead and do it. I'm going to enter the
5 fixed ts appropriate and mostly -- I recognize
6 no-contact order as requested. I think it's
6 that you have suffered some punishment already.
7 appropriate.
7 But I also want you to understand that it's easy
a
Mr. Willard, I don't understand the
8 to stand there and say you Intend to change. I
9 thinking that went into what you did. But what I
9 d id see that you had a write-up for food
10 saw, when I read the record, was kind of a
10 spreading, whatever that is, after this Incident
11 vicious, unprovoked attack from -- you're a pretty
11 happened.
12 good-sized Individual. You're just physically
12
But -- so, I mean, I recognize that you
13 somewhat Imposing. I don't know about Mr. Rivera, 13 have had some institutional discipline imposed as
14 but I don't think he was quite that size.
14 a result of this already. But what you did is a
15
And I don't know -- I mean, I read the
15 crime, and you hurt someone quite severely.
16 reports and the justification you thought you
16 Broken ribs; I think the count was seven. No,
17 needed to do that as a preemptive matter. That's
17 five. 3 through 7.
18 the kind of culture that has to stop, And your
18
So for that, with an unprovoked attack,
19 record to date isn't all that good.
19 Mr. Willard, I do think the recommendation from
20
Now, I realize you had some struggles
20 the State Is appropriate in the case. I am going
21 as a youngster. I did read the entire earlier
21 to impose a sentence of two years fixed and four
22 presentence report, and I have read the rider
22 indeterminate. By statute that sentence will be
23 review report. But I am concemed about the level
23 consecutive to the sentence you're currently
24 of violence here, And I'm also concerned to the
24 serving.
25 extent words get -- the word gets out -- and I am
25
Mr. Guy, is there any restitution?
13 or 1s sheets
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MR. GUY: Your Honor, there Is no
restitution requested in this case, no.
THE COURT: Thank you. I will impose court
costs. Given, Mr. WIiiard, the financial
circumstances, your young age, and the record that
you have, I recognize that once -- together with
whatever is accumulating on your earlier crimes, I
am not going to Impose any fine.
I will impose court costs as required
by statute. And because this happened within the
confines of an Institution where you' re already
confined, you do not get credit for time served,
so your sentence w ill start as of today.
Mr. Willard, I understand you're not
going to be happy with this. You don't have to
be. I just suggest you remember the words that
you told me this morning, tum a 180 Into your
life, do your time, and then go out and behave
yourself. You're now approaching an age where you
should be starting to grow up. This is your
chance to prove it.
Questions?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: That is the judgment and
sentence of this Court. You're entitled to appeal
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1 any final judgment of this Court to the Idaho
2 Supreme Court. That appeal must be taken within
3 42 days of the date of the entry of the judgment.
4
You are entitled to be represented by
s an attorney on any such appeal. And If you cannot
6 afford one, one will be appointed to represent you
7 at public expense, and your costs on appeal will
8 be paid if you are an indigent person.
9
I will also order that the defendant
10 submit a DNA sample and right thumbprint
11 Impression to the Idaho database as required by
12 the statute.
13
(End of proceeding,)
14
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